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Entrepreneurial success in family SMEs is largely determined by the knowledge, skills, 
and new ideas contributed by board directors, the most important actors in the 
formulation of corporate strategy and decision making. The composition of family SME 
boards has traditionally been homogeneous, as such boards usually comprise male 
family members. Boards’ contributions, however, depend on their level of diversity and 
strategic involvement. This study analyzes the moderating effects of two main sources 
of board diversity in family firms, family involvement level and gender diversity, as 
potential means of enhancing family firms’ success when exploiting entrepreneurial 
initiatives. This study also explores whether these two potential moderators depend on 
the strategic involvement of the board directors. Based on a sample of 230 Spanish 
family firms, we found that the link between entrepreneurial orientation and 
performance is stronger in firms with lower levels of family involvement and higher 
levels of gender diversity in the board. Moreover, the board’s high strategic 
involvement may strengthen the positive impact of gender diversity and change the 






Researchers generally accept entrepreneurial orientation (EO) as an instrument for 
measuring a firm’s proclivity toward entrepreneurship (Lages et al. 2016; Rauch et al. 
2009) and an important driver of firm performance (e.g., Anderson and Eshima 2013). 
Research on the EO–firm performance relationship in the family business context has 
increased significantly because many researchers see family firms as a unique 
opportunity to analyze entrepreneurship (Garcés-Galdeano et al. 2016; Schepers et al. 
2014). Their unique characteristics, based on the interaction between family and 
business goals in decision making, affect how family firms are governed (e.g., in 
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relation to risk behavior and strategic orientation) and have implications for their 
entrepreneurial attitudes and, ultimately, firm outcomes (Randerson et al. 2015).  
Scholars generally acknowledge that boards of directors play an essential role in 
firms’ strategy decision making (Corbetta and Salvato 2004) and can contribute to a 
firm’s entrepreneurship (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). However, little is known 
about how board characteristics explain entrepreneurial attitudes and their outcomes (for 
some contributions, see Bammens et al. 2011). According to Hambrick (2007), 
directors’ experiences, knowledge, and values shape information-seeking and 
information-evaluation processes, thus shaping board behaviors and decision making. 
However, directors’ cognitive frames are difficult to capture, so researchers use 
directors’ observable characteristics as proxies for cognitive frames (Post and Byron 
2015). Diversity among directors’ observable characteristics may help in the design of 
new entrepreneurial initiatives and in converting them into superior performance 
(Fuentes-Fuentes et al. 2015; Samara and Berbegal-Mirabent 2017). For the boards of 
family SMEs, gender diversity and differences among family involvement levels seem 
to play a prominent role in diversity (Carter et al. 2010; Bammens et al. 2011). On the 
one hand, family firms usually have more female directors than their non-family 
counterparts, being on the “gender-diverse” end of the spectrum of private firms 
(Wilson et al. 2013). However, the literature reports inconclusive findings on the impact 
of board gender diversity (Ali et al. 2014). On the other hand, diversity in family 
business boards may also be closely related to the level of family involvement since the 
family provides an additional source of diversity not found in non-family firms 
(Anderson and Reeb 2004; Arosa et al. 2010). However, the extent to which family 
representation can affect a board’s activities has received less attention, and studies of 
family SMEs are even more limited (Maseda et al. 2015). 
Drawing from the idea that the boards of directors of family SMEs mostly 
comprise family members and that their entrepreneurial attitudes influence firms’ 
strategic decisions, our study sheds new light on the current debate about the effect of 
board diversity on entrepreneurship in family firms and consequently on their 
performance. We consider diversity in terms of both family and gender representation 
on boards of directors as moderators in the EO–firm performance relationship, which 
could help explain the inconclusive results in the literature. We also attempt to capture 
the effect of gender diversity and family involvement in boards at different levels of the 
Strategic Involvement of the Board of Directors (SIBD). To develop our hypotheses, we 
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adopt the Socioemotional Wealth (SEW) perspective, an overarching theoretical 
framework used to research family businesses (e.g., Berrone et al. 2012; Gómez-Mejía 
et al. 2007), and the Resource Based View (RBV) perspective, an appropriate means of 
analyzing organizations that are unusually complex and rich in intangible resources 
such as family firms (Habbershon and Williams 1999). Regarding the SEW, we 
consider family involvement on a board as a reflection of the family’s ability to impact 
firm behavior and performance (De Massis et al. 2016). Additionally, given that family 
directors’ goals may vary across family firms (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013), we also 
assume that different emphases on financial goals vs. socio-emotional goals may be 
placed (Sciascia et al. 2014). Regarding the RBV, this theoretical perspective permits us 
to examine the relationships among firm-level processes, strategy, performance, and 
sustainable competitive advantage for the family firm (Yeniaras et al. 2017). This 
approach allows us to discuss the role of both family and female involvement in 
decision-making processes and in the relationship between EO and firm performance.  
By testing our model on a sample of 230 Spanish family SMEs, we extend the 
knowledge on firm-level entrepreneurial attitudes in family SMEs, making several 
important contributions to the field of family business research. First, we shed light on 
the inconclusive results concerning the EO–firm performance relationship in family 
SMEs by considering the characteristics of the decision makers at the corporate 
governance level. We offer a more exhaustive look at the effect of the board in the EO–
firm performance connection by combining board demographic variables (female 
director ratio and family director ratio) with board behavioral variables (SIBD; the 
extent to which boards perform their strategic advisory role and engage in strategic 
decision making). Second, we contribute to the literature on gender and corporate 
governance by helping to clarify the inconclusive findings on the effect of female board 
representation on strategic decision making (Terjesen et al. 2009). Furthermore, by 
analyzing whether gender diversity may partially moderate the relationship between EO 
and firm performance, this study shows that Spanish SMEs, which operate in a country 
where most firms are family-owned and traditionally feature minimal female 
participation in high business positions (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008), may 
benefit from a higher female representation on boards when attempting to transform an 
entrepreneurial attitude into tangible firm performance. Finally, we contribute to the 
family business literature by examining family involvement at the board level. The 
existing literature does not offer conclusive results about how family involvement may 
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affect the board’s various tasks and processes (Zattoni et al. 2015), or entrepreneurship 
in particular. We help fill this gap by examining the effect of family involvement in the 
board on the EO–firm performance relationship in family SMEs. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. We first discuss the 
theoretical background of the study and develop the research hypotheses. The next 
section explains the data collection method and measures used in the study. We then 
present the results. Finally, we discuss our findings, acknowledge the study’s 
limitations, explain its implications, and suggest directions for future research. 
 
Theoretical background and hypothesis development 
EO-firm performance relationship 
The disposition toward entrepreneurship is crucial for firm survival and success 
(Gunawan et al. 2016) and is an antecedent of entrepreneurial behavior (Liñán and 
Fayolle 2016). To capture this firm-level entrepreneurial attitude, Miller (1983) and 
Covin and Slevin (1991) developed the entrepreneurial orientation (EO) construct, 
whereby firms with a high degree of EO are regarded as having a set of distinct but 
related attitudes that have the qualities of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking 
(Covin and Wales 2012).  
One of the most widely studied issues in EO is its correlation with firm 
performance in both the conceptual (e.g., Covin and Wales 2012) and empirical aspects 
(e.g. Anderson and Eshima 2013; Moreno and Casillas 2008; Van Doorn et al. 2013). 
Schepers et al. (2014, p. 39) affirm that the logic behind this relationship is that 
“entrepreneurial firms will identify and pursue lucrative product/market opportunities 
which in turn will improve their company financial performance (Zahra and Covin 
1995)”. In their meta-analysis of EO–business performance, Rauch et al. (2009) found a 
moderate positive correlation between these two variables, although they highlighted 
that the EO–performance relationship is contextual in nature. Put differently, the nature 
and degree of the EO–performance linkage varies depending on the endogenous and 
exogenous phenomena influencing a given firm (Anderson and Eshima 2013).  
 
In the context of family firms, some studies have identified both external and internal 
factors that explain variations in EO among family businesses. Regarding the former, 
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how the competitive environment (Lumpkin and Dess, 2001) and firm networks (Stam 
and Elfring 2008) influence EO have been studied. Regarding internal factors, authors 
have focused on how EO is affected by the effects of CEO characteristics (Boling et al. 
2016; Cruz and Nordqvist 2012), the impact of generational involvement in 
management (Casillas et al. 2011; Sciascia et al. 2013), the differences between long 
and short orientations (Lumpkin et al. 2010), and organizational culture (Zahra et al. 
2004). 
From an RBV perspective, the interaction between the family and the business has 
been regarded as a source of complex and difficult-to-imitate resources (Habbershon 
and Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al. 2003; Sirmon and Hitt 2003) which foster 
orientations and attitudes that may impact entrepreneurship (Casillas et al., 2011). 
Several studies reveal that family influence has a significant role in boosting 
entrepreneurial initiatives in order to assure long-term survival (Miller and Le-Breton 
Miller 2011). However, other authors claim that family influence can lead to free-riding 
behavior, perquisites, and privileges that can generate an inefficient use of resources and 
additional costs (Schepers et al. 2014), in line with what the “dark side” of SEW reveals 
(Kellermanns et al. 2012). This proclivity toward SEW preservation may hamper the 
transformation of the effects of entrepreneurial initiatives into higher profits (Schepers 
et al. 2014). However, we propose that higher EO facilitates sales growth and better 
firm performance in family SMEs (though not as fully as for their nonfamily 
counterparts). We thus hypothesize as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1. Family SMEs feature a positive relationship between EO and firm 
performance.  
 
The fact that the EO–firm performance relationship is contextual (Rauch et al. 
2009) suggests that it may have more than a simple direct link (Kollman and Stockmann 
2014). Thus, it is important to consider it within a contingency framework (Anderson 
and Eshima 2013). We focus on the importance of boards in this relationship, given that 
entrepreneurial success in family businesses is largely determined by the ideas 
contributed by board directors (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). Boards’ 
contributions depend, however, on their level of diversity (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; 
Maseda et al. 2015) and strategic involvement (Machold et al. 2011) because they give 
advice on various strategy issues, from formulation to outcomes (Zahra et al. 2009), that 
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may compensate for the managerial shortcomings from which many family SMEs suffer 
(Zattoni et al. 2015). Hence, we focus on the potential moderating impact on this 
relationship of two main diversity factors, family involvement and female involvement, 
in boards with different strategic involvement levels.  
 
Boards of directors in family SMEs 
Boards of directors represent the highest decision making level and play various roles 
related to strategic processes (Zattoni et al. 2015). The literature on the role of boards of 
directors depicts boards as a source of competitiveness and an essential contributor to 
firm value creation (Pugliese et al 2009). Following the  RBV approach, many studies 
acknowledge that boards can improve a firm’s performance through the capabilities and 
resources directors offer, with the potential to provide competitive advantages for 
family firms (Bammens et al. 2011; Sirmon and Hitt 2003). On the one hand, directors 
are generally regarded as having a high level of expertise, given their general business 
knowledge and professional experience in strategic problem solving based on university 
training and outside work experience (Kim et al. 2009). In addition, their specific 
knowledge about a firm’s internal processes creates the perception that board directors 
are experts (Pugliese and Wenstop 2007; Zattoni et al. 2015) and can influence the 
speed and breadth of the top management team’s (TMT) strategic action capabilities 
(Kim et al. 2009). On the other hand, board members usually have more access to 
valuable external resources through their networks, which may help the firm implement 
existing strategies (Wincent et al. 2014). Overall, research shows that the board of 
directors can significantly influence entrepreneurship (Zattoni and Pugliese 2012) and 
firm performance (Pugliese and Wenstop 2007).  
The current understanding of the influence of the board on entrepreneurship is 
based on large listed companies run by professional managers (Machold et al. 2011), 
especially large Anglo-American companies (Machold et al. 2011). However, family 
businesses are the dominant form of management and governance in Europe (Corbetta 
and Salvato 2012) and the US (Astrachan and Shanker 2003). Most of these family 
firms are SMEs, which differ from large firms in several ways, including their more 
concentrated ownership structures, a greater degree of overlap between ownership and 
management, and less complex decision-making and control structures (Maseda et al. 
2015). As pointed out by Uhlaner and colleagues (2007), firms owned by a single 
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entrepreneur or by a dominant family owner coalition often rely on informal social 
controls based on mutual trust, a shared vision, and commitment to the ﬁrm rather than 
on contractual governance. Pugliese and Wenstop (2007) suggest that the main concerns 
of owners in family SMEs may include firm survival, growth rate, family welfare, 
succession plans, and personal status, instead of the short-term financial returns that are 
a core concern of shareholders in public companies. These different focuses may affect 
how boards perform their strategic tasks. Small firms have a stronger need than large 
firms for the board’s strategic contributions to firm survival and growth (Huse 2000). 
This may impact the strategic role of boards in family SMEs, making them less 
regulated, more informal and more heterogeneous (Uhlaner et al. 2007). Therefore, we 
focus on how two main sources of board heterogeneity in family SMEs—family 
involvement in the board (family director ratio) and female involvement in the board 
(female director ratio)—affect the EO–firm performance relationship (see Figure 1).  
 
Family involvement in the board in the EO–firm performance relationship 
Family businesses have unique governance characteristics (Basco 2013; De Massis et 
al. 2016) that may influence their decision-making process and entrepreneurship 
(Nordqvist et al. 2008). These specific governance features stem from the continuous 
interaction between the family and the business (Lumpkin et al. 2008), which may 
require decisions that balance family with business logics to achieve family- and 
business-oriented goals (Schepers et al. 2014). From a SEW perspective, family-
oriented goals may address non-economic issues that could help achieve the family’s 
affective needs, such as identity, status, ability to influence, and the perpetuation of the 
family dynasty (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). As such, preserving the family’s SEW, the 
stock of affect-related value family owners have invested in the firm, becomes a goal in 
itself (Berrone et al. 2010; Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007) and may lead family businesses to 
develop different behaviors (Schepers et al. 2014). The SEW approach suggests that, 
when making strategic decisions, family owners tend to have distinctive family-related 
priorities and risk preferences that may influence the firm’s strategic decisions. These 
distinctive decisions and behaviors have special relevance in the main governance 
device, the board of directors (Michiels et al. 2015), where family involvement plays an 
important role (Calabro et al. 2013; Zattoni et al. 2015).  
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These arguments suggest that when looking at the contingent role of the board in 
the EO–firm performance relationship, the level of family involvement in the board is 
highly relevant. A high degree of family involvement may enhance the firm’s tendency 
to prioritize family control and survival as a family firm (Berrone et al. 2012; Kotlar 
and De Massis 2013) over pure profit or growth maximization goals (De Massis et al. 
2016). A high family involvement may thus provide an incentive for parsimony (Carney 
2005), which may reinforce the proclivity to avoid designing and implementing risky 
strategic initiatives to preserve the family wealth invested in the business (Berrone et al. 
2012; Gomez-Mejía et al. 2007). This risk-averse disposition in boards with high family 
involvement may be detrimental to the EO–firm performance relationship, given that 
risk taking is required for developing entrepreneurial initiatives and for transforming 
them into tangible results (Covin and Wales 2012; Kollman and Stockman 2014). 
Several other factors  are also crucial for transforming EO into firm performance. 
According to RBV, diversity in knowledge and expertise are valuable resources in the 
design of new entrepreneurial initiatives and for converting these into superior 
performance (Pugliese and Wenstop 2007; Zattoni et al. 2015). Though boards 
composed mostly of family directors have a wide firm-specific knowledge due to their 
internalization of firm-specific processes (Bammens et al. 2011), they usually lack 
variety in their knowledge, perspectives, and expertise due to their common educational 
and functional backgrounds (Lai and Chen 2014). Thus, diversity in educational and 
work expertise may facilitate the debate about entrepreneurial initiatives, generate more 
creativity in designing and implementing entrepreneurial activities (Pugliese and 
Wenstop 2007), and consequently lead to better firm performance, ultimately 
reinforcing the EO–firm performance relationship.  
Furthermore, high family involvement in the board may suggest nepotism, given 
that this is frequently how family directors are selected (Le-Breton-Miller and Miller 
2009). This problem may indicate a lack of managerial talent, one of the main effects of 
the dark side of SEW (Kellermanns et al. 2012). Hence, boards with low family 
involvement may have more of the knowledge and expertise needed to  transform EO 
into firm performance. Furthermore, non-family directors may add to the business 
connections with external stakeholders that may provide access to information, 
knowledge, and even financial resources (Voordeckers et al. 2007) that may help 
transform an entrepreneurial attitude into tangible results. We thus propose that a higher 
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family involvement in the board may decrease the positive relationship between EO and 
firm performance:  
 
Hypothesis 2. Family involvement in the board of directors moderates the 
positive relationship between EO and performance such that lower levels of 
family involvement in the board strengthen this positive relationship 
 
Gender diversity in the board in the EO–firm performance relationship 
Following the RBV perspective, the pooled personal resources of an individual 
can be considered an important source of knowledge, skills, experience, and strategic 
perspectives for firms (Sirmon and Hitt 2003). The literature suggests that diversity 
tends to generate creativity, innovation, and quality decision making at individual and 
group levels (for an overview, see Martínez-Jiménez 2009; Terjesen et al. 2009). At the 
firm level, a board with diverse members improves the main corporate governance 
mechanism responsible for corporate strategy design, monitoring and evaluation by 
introducing broader knowledge bases, experience, and values (Post and Byron 2015). 
Gender diversity is regarded as a significant factor that enriches and improves the 
effectiveness of decision making on family SMEs’ boards (Lim and Envick 2013). 
Studies have highlighted female involvement as a main source of board heterogeneity 
(Simpson et al. 2010), especially in family firms, as these are considered among the few 
organizations that offer women real opportunities to reach the highest positions in 
business (Martínez-Jiménez 2009). Indeed, family businesses are unique settings in 
which to study women’s incorporation into boards, as they offer specific advantages as 
well as drawbacks. Regarding the advantages, Martínez Jiménez (2009) highlights the 
importance of the following:  
[F]lexible schedules, which help women combine their professional 
responsibilities with child care; access to sectors traditionally regarded as 
“masculine” (e.g., construction); job security; the satisfaction of working for 
themselves or for their families; a supportive environment; and more chance of 
accessing positions of responsibility, professional challenges, and opportunities 




Cole (1997) found that women in family firms achieved high positions and did not 
suffer from the feared “glass ceiling”. Moreover, Dumas (1992) showed that women 
had greater career opportunities and felt highly satisfied working in these organizations 
as a consequence of being encouraged to participate actively in the firm since 
childhood.  
Nevertheless, women also face challenges, aside from the same issues faced in 
nonfamily businesses (Star and Yudkin 1996), that are unique to family businesses, 
such as struggles for power and authority, relationships with other family and non-
family members, and conflicts over roles and loyalties (Dumas, 1992). Iannarelli (1992) 
concluded that women were less encouraged to join the firm, thus spending less time in 
the family firm, and developing fewer skills than their brothers had. Vera and Dean 
(2005) suggested that an important factor in avoiding this problem is related to work 
experience acquired outside the firm, as this may give women professionals both self-
confidence and credibility.   
The research reveals that the evidence on gender diversity is scant and conflicting 
with studies finding positive, negative, and no relationships between gender and firm 
value (Bohren and Strom 2010). The empirical results on the effects of female 
involvement in boards in terms of firm performance are also inconclusive (Ali et al. 
2014). For example, in a review of women board directors, Terjesen et al. (2009) 
suggested that gender diversity affected board dynamic but not the firm’s bottom line. 
There is an ongoing debate about whether female representation on boards adds value 
by improving firm outcomes (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008), has a detrimental 
effect on firm value (Adams and Ferreira 2009), or has no impact on firm performance 
(Carter et al. 2010; Rose 2007). These inconsistent results, in addition to the fact that 
relatively little research links gender diversity and board process tasks, makes more 
research necessary (Wilson et al. 2013). This is why research has begun to include more 
“nuanced variables and more proximal outcomes than firm performance” in studies on 
the effects of gender diversity on boards (Johnson et al. 2013, p. 239).  
Male and female directors behave differently due to the differences between 
women and men (Adams and Ferreira 2009). Women base their leadership on a higher 
sensitivity to the human needs of all firm members and a greater flexibility with respect 
to roles and judgments (Salganicoff 1990). These differences can produce more 
opinions, higher discrepancies, and critical questions inside boardrooms, which may be 
time-consuming and may slow the decision-making process (Campbell and Minguez-
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Vera 2008). In some cases, these discrepancies could lead to increased conflicts among 
board members and destructive behaviors (Ali et al., 2014), which may generate less 
fluid communication and less cooperative attitudes (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
2008). All of these factors could ultimately create unproductive interactions (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009) and decrease strategic consensus, thus hindering the board’s contribution 
to the EO–firm performance relationship.  
Despite these potentially negative effects in extreme cases, gender diversity in the 
boardroom usually allows family SMEs to make more creative, innovative, and 
effective decisions (Wilson et al. 2013). Women directors have a greater ability to 
multitask as well as to overcome contradictions in decision making (Francis 1999). 
Gender diversity may thus enable access to a wider pool of human capital (Runyan et al. 
2006). Furthermore, female directors are usually better prepared than are male directors 
(Post and Byron 2015) because they usually have higher university education and hold 
advanced degrees (Carter et al. 2010).Women directors usually outperform in terms of 
marketing and sales competence (Groysberg and Bell 2013), so heterogeneous boards 
may have a better understanding of the market and a better capacity to design successful 
responses to market opportunities (Carter et al. 2010). This is in line with the stronger 
ability of women directors to trust their instincts and intuition rather than make 
decisions based solely on analysis and rationality (Martinez Jimenez 2009). In addition, 
male and female directors have different networks, which may provide complementary 
information about suppliers and consumers in different market segments (Ali et al. 
2014), thus facilitating successful product development (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 
2008). 
Women directors also contribute useful female leadership qualities (Post and 
Byron 2015). In this sense, their colleagues and subordinates usually regard female 
directors as more supportive than their male counterparts, which may encourage the 
design and implementation of entrepreneurial initiatives (Ali et al. 2014). In addition, 
women directors are usually less risk-averse and have a lower tendency toward radical 
decision making (Croson and Gneezy 2009); this favors sustainable investments 
(Charness and Gneezy 2012), which may decrease the failure rate of entrepreneurial 
initiatives. 
Finally, more diverse boards may have better qualified directors if firms recruit 
them from both genders without prejudice (Campbell and Minguez Vera 2008). 
Broadening the selection pool of directors to include both genders without sex 
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discrimination helps firms hire better talent (Ali et al. 2014). Thus, both public and 
private institution reports recommend gender diversity on boards to enhance board 
effectiveness and add value (e.g., Credit Suisse 2012). For these reasons, we propose 
that a higher female involvement on boards may reinforce the positive relationship 
between EO and firm performance.  
 
Hypothesis 3. Female involvement in the board of directors moderates the 
positive relationship between EO and performance such that higher levels of 
female involvement in the board strengthen this positive relationship 
 
Influence of the strategic involvement level of the board in gender diversity and 
family involvement effects  
The effects of the knowledge and expertise of highly competent, prestigious, and 
diverse board members may be somewhat subject to their strategic involvement (Zattoni 
et al. 2015). Scholars consider SIBD as the key differentiator in the increasing debate on 
the differences between active and passive boards (Machold et al. 2011). Board 
members’ real contributions to a firm’s strategic process depends on the degree of their 
real involvement in actively introducing strategy proposals, determining the long-term 
objectives of the business, implementing strategic decisions, and checking and 
measuring their impact (Minichilli et al. 2009). This active role may be particularly 
relevant in corporate entrepreneurship, given that it is the result of active collaboration 
between directors and senior managers (Zahra et al. 2009). This interaction aims to 
develop the business (Minichilli et al. 2009), so the board focuses on not only 
controlling the strategy (Kim et al. 2009) but also on cooperating with the TMT in 
strategy formulation and implementation (Machold et al. 2011).  
Boards with higher strategic involvement may make the most of their 
characteristics while making strategic decisions (Calabro et al. 2013; Machold et al. 
2011). Thus, as we propose in hypothesis 2, boards with a high SIBD and high family 
involvement may reinforce the bias of the family businesses toward family control, to 
the detriment of economic goals such as profitability and growth. Furthermore, this high 
SIBD in boards with a high proportion of family directors may strengthen the tendency 
toward parsimony (Carney 2005) and risk aversion (Voordeckers et al. 2007). 
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Accordingly, a high SIBD may reinforce the use of family directors’ firm-specific 
knowledge instead of the adoption of diverse knowledge and perspectives that are more 
common among boards with less family involvement (Zattoni et al. 2015). Similarly, 
when directors are less involved in strategic decision making, their characteristics have 
less impact on the strategic process (Kim et al. 2009). Boards with high family 
involvement and low SIBD may not prioritize family control over short-term firm 
performance and may weaken the inclination toward parsimony (Zattoni et al. 2015) 
and risk aversion (Minichilli et al. 2009; Voordeckers et al. 2007), thus decreasing the 
negative impact of family involvement on the board in the EO–firm performance 
relationship (see Figure 1).  
In each scenario, the SIBD may influence the moderating effect of family 
involvement on the board in the EO–firm performance relationship such that a high 
SIBD strengthens the negative moderating effect of family involvement in the EO–firm 
performance relationship while a low SIBD may decrease this negative moderating 
effect. We thus propose the following:  
 
Hypothesis 4. The SIBD affects the moderating effect of family involvement 
in the board in the EO–firm performance relationship such that a high SIBD 
strengthens this negative moderating effect while a low SIBD weakens it  
 
In line with hypothesis 4, the degree to which board members engage in strategic 
decision making may influence the effect of female involvement in the board in the EO–
firm performance relationship (see Figure 1). Boards with high strategic involvement 
may have more alternatives to evaluate during the problem-solving process (Rose 2007) 
due to the active involvement of diverse board members (Machold et al. 2011) during 
which female directors may contribute their unique knowledge, perspectives, and skills 
(Chapple and Humphrey, 2014). Further, a high SIBD may help firms design successful 
responses to current and new customer needs (Groysberg and Bell 2013) due to women 
directors’ stronger marketing and sales abilities (Ali et al. 2014). A higher SIBD may 
help board members exchange information collected through the various networks (e.g., 
suppliers, consumers) that male and female directors have (Wilson et al. 2013). 
Additionally, SIBD may contribute significant and perceptible support of the kind 
usually provided by female directors to colleagues and subordinates due to their 
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leadership style (Post and Byron 2015). This support and confidence may be key for 
designing entrepreneurial initiatives and successfully implementing them. 
 Female directors make contributions based on their unique knowledge, 
capabilities (Ferreira and Adams 2009), marketing abilities, and networks (Ali et al. 
2014), and encourage entrepreneurial initiatives (Post and Byron 2015), which may be 
diminished in firms with low SIBD. We thus propose the following: 
 
Hypothesis 5. SIBD affects the moderating effect of female board involvement 
in the EO–firm performance relationship such that a high SIBD strengthens 






































Sample and data collection 
We test our hypotheses using quantitative methods based on survey data collected in 
Spain. We based the survey on measures established in the literature and collected data 
in June 2013 through telephone interviews conducted by a professional survey research 
firm to ensure quality and a high response rate. Before the survey began, we sent a letter 
to the CEPs of these businesses describing our research and asking for their 
cooperation. We selected CEOs as respondents because they are the best key informants 
given their qualifications in organization-wide issues and are better placed than are 
other board members to report on these issues (Calabro et al. 2013).  
We selected Spanish family SMEs from the SABI database (Iberian Balance 
Sheet Analysis System). Among the criteria used to define “family firm,” we selected 
two (Dyer 2003): (1) whether one or more families controlled business ownership and 
(2) active family participation in its management. We considered 50% as the minimum 
equity indicating that a family has control (Voordeckers et al. 2007). According to these 
criteria, we examined the shareholding structure (percentage of common stock) and the 
identity of ownership in detail (Arosa et al. 2010). We then refined the sample by 
removing entries without mailing addresses or those with incongruent data, obtaining a 
final sample of 1,710 family SMEs. We then pretested the questionnaires to ensure that 
the questions were clear and understandable by conducting informal interviews with 
nine randomly chosen CEOs of family firms not included in the initial sample to discuss 
the survey instrument and modify the wording where necessary. 
Starting from the sample of 1,710 non-listed Spanish SMEs, we obtained 230 
responses (13.45%), a typical response rate for this type of research (e.g., Brettel and 
Rottenberger 2013; Uhlaner et al. 2007). We tested for any non-response bias by 
comparing the answers of early and late respondents. Based on the order in which we 
received responses, we divided the total pool into two response waves. These had no 
statistically significant differences, suggesting that non-response bias was not a problem 





Common method bias 
Given that this study relies on CEOs as key respondents and on information provided by 
one person in a single timeframe (Campbell and Fiske 1959), the results may have 
common method bias. We addressed common method variance by performing ex-ante 
adjustments in the survey design. First, to avoid having participants respond in a purely 
socially desirable way, we ensured respondent anonymity and absolute confidentiality 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Second, we segmented the independent and dependent variables 
into different sections of the survey so that it would be difficult to link the various 
concepts (Kortmann 2015). This design and the extensiveness of the survey encourage 
respondents to think carefully about each answer; respondents also had the opportunity 
to ask the interviewer to read the instructions and definitions for each question 
(Podsakoff et al. 2003). Third, we considered different response formats within and 
across the sections of the survey (Grewal et al 2010). Most of the questions used 10-
point Likert scales, though we used different indices, such as “completely 
agree”/“completely disagree,” “completely wrong”/“completely right,” and “very 
seldom”/“very frequently” (Kortmann 2015). 
Furthermore, we tested for common method variance using two post hoc tests of 
the data: Harman’s single-factor test (Harman 1967; Podsakoff and Organ 1986) and a 
procedure in Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Liang et al. (2007) used to address common 
method bias. The first test presumes that, if common method bias exists, either a single 
factor will emerge from the factor analysis of all measurement items, or one general 
factor that accounts for most of the variance will emerge (Kortmann 2015). In this case, 
Harman’s single-factor test revealed that the first factor accounted for 24.1% of the total 
variance in the sample, while four factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 accounted 
for 54.2% of the variance. In the second method, we included a common method factor 
and linked it to all single-indicator constructs converted from the observed indicators. 
We then compared the indicator variances explained by the method factor to the 
variance explained by the substantive constructs. On average, the constructs explained 
71.01% of the variance in the sample, whereas the method factor explained 0.67% of 
the variance on average, resulting in a substantive-to-method variance ratio of about 
105.99 (see Appendix 5.1). Moreover, most method factor loadings were insignificant. 
Given that both tests indicated a lack of common method bias, we concluded that 





We used variables in our analysis drawn from previously validated instruments. 
We based the dependent variable (firm performance) and the main independent variable 
(EO) on multiple-item constructs, with all items measured through Likert-type scales.  
Table 1 summarizes the main descriptive statistics of the firms in the sample. 
 
Table 1. Sample description 
Firm characteristic  Mean SD 
Number of observations  230  
Firm size (employees)  97.72 113.51 
Firm age (years)  28.46 14.81 
Generation in control (CEO)  2.03 0.75 
Generations involved  1.48 0.58 
Board size (directors)  4.21 1.85 
Family involvement (family director ratio)  0.84 0.23 
Female involvement (female director ratio)  0.26 0.23 
 
Family firm performance. We followed previous research indicating that 
subjective measures of performance can actually reflect objective measures and enhance 
validity and reliability (Lumpkin and Dess 2001). We asked respondents to evaluate two 
items on an 11-point scale (0 = “Completely wrong” to 10 = “Completely right”): the 
increase in their firm’s sales compared to their major competitors during the last five 
years (Sorenson et al. 2009) and their firms’ financial results compared to that of their 
major competitors in the last five years (Vallejo-Martos 2011). 
However, given that objective performance measures are less prone to common 
method bias (Stam and Elfring 2008), we tested the robustness of our family firm 
performance measure by calculating the correlation between this construct and two 
other objective measures (Wiklund and Shepherd 2005), ROA and ROE, with ROA 
defined as EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization) 
divided by total assets (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Villalonga and Amit 2006) and ROE 
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defined as net income divided by the book value of equity (Maseda et al. 2015). 
Significant correlations between the firm performance construct and ROA (r= 0.39, 
p<0.001) as well as the firm performance construct and ROE (r= 0.44, p<0.001) 
supported the validity of the subjective measure.  
Entrepreneurial orientation. We measured the EO of family firms using Covin 
and Slevin’s (1989) proposed second-order construct, based on the works of Miller and 
Friesen (1982) and Miller (1983) and refined into its current definition (e.g., Cruz and 
Nordqvist 2012; Nordqvist et al. 2008; Moreno and Casillas 2008; Sciascia et al. 2013). 
This construct has three dimensions—innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking—
as first-order constructs, each with three items. EO is a second-order reflective construct 
expressing changes in the underlying latent construct as reflected in changes to the 
indicators (Jarvis et al. 2003). We measure EO using a “Type I” second-order factor 
specification (i.e., reflective first-order, reflective second-order), since both the first-
order dimensions and the second-order construct are reflective variables (Covin and 
Wales 2012). Higher overall scores on the 9-item EO scale indicate a high EO, while 
lower scores indicate a more conservative orientation. 
Family involvement in the board. We measured family involvement in the board 
as the proportion of family members on the board (family director ratio). For this 
purpose, respondents indicated the number of actively involved family members on the 
board and the total number of board members. We then divided the number of family 
board members by the total number of board members to calculate the family director 
ratio (Bammens et al. 2008). 
Female involvement in the board. We measured female involvement in the board 
as the proportion of women on the board (female director ratio). Respondents indicated 
the number of women actively involved in the board and the total number of board 
members. We then divided the number of women board members by the total number of 
board members to calculate the female director ratio (Adams and Ferreira 2009; 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008). 
Strategic involvement of the board of directors. We measured SIBD on a scale 
validated by Machold et al. (2011) and Minichilli et al. (2009) that measures the various 
strategy processes to which boards of directors should contribute (Machold et al. 2011). 
Respondents evaluated four items on an 11-point scale (0 = “very low” to 10 = “very 
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high”) in terms of the degree of the board’s involvement in (1) actively initiating 
strategic proposals; (2) making decisions on long-term strategies and main goals; (3) 
implementing strategic decisions, and (4) controlling strategic decisions. We computed 
the variable strategy involvement as an index using the mean value of these items 
(Machold et al. 2011).  
Control variables. We included additional variables to ensure a proper model 
specification and to consider possible alternative explanations for the results. First, we 
controlled for firm size, measured by the actual number of full-time employees. Larger 
firms usually have more slack resources, which encourage entrepreneurial initiatives 
(Samiee and Walters 1990) and tend to reflect higher-quality management, 
technological intensity, and investment in research and development (Calabro et al. 
2013). Second, we included firm age, measured as the number of years since the firm’s 
founding because younger firms usually have more trouble launching entrepreneurial 
initiatives given their limited experience in the market. On the other hand, younger 
firms are typically better positioned to capitalize on the benefits of diversity, such as 
creativity and innovation (Ali et al. 2014). We use the log of both variables as a control 
to adjust for skewness. Third, we controlled for board size, measured as the number of 
board directors with voting rights, since the corporate governance literature suggests 
that board size impacts board task performance (Calabro et al. 2013), given that larger 
boards represent more perspectives and a wider set of skills, though this can also create 
coordination conflicts (Wilson et al. 2013). Additionally, some research finds that larger 
boards have more female directors (Terjesen et al. 2009). Fourth, for the generation in 
control, we used a dummy variable (first, second, or third and subsequent as a suppressed 
category) to reflect which generation has management control (Sciascia et al. 2013). We 
included this variable based on prior research indicating that family firm generation has a 
significant effect on EO (Cruz and Nordqvist 2012). Fifth, we controlled for generational 
involvement, measured as a dummy variable using a direct single item in which CEOs 
indicated the number of generations (one, two, three, or more) currently involved in the 
firm’s management (Kellermanns and Eddleston 2006). Previous studies show that the 
number of generations involved in the top management team influences the level of 






We conducted the analysis using structural equation modeling because our model 
included latent constructs (Hair et al. 2012). We used the partial least squares (PLS) 
approach since some of its main characteristics make it especially suitable for this 
research. First, PLS can capture the normative implications of the total system of 
variables and holistically clarify the entire model (Schuster and Holtbrügge 2014), 
which is relevant in our study because we estimated a model of simultaneous 
relationships between two different board composition diversity factors (family 
involvement and female involvement) and SIBD level. Hence, PLS can provide a 
complete overview of the model. Second, the PLS technique allows researchers to 
optimally weigh and combine items for constructs along different dimensions to ensure 
a reliable assessment of the second-order latent variable (Real et al. 2014). Finally, 
previous studies show that the PLS-SEM algorithm transforms non-normal data in line 
with the central limit theorem (Hair et al. 2012), making the PLS-SEM results robust 
when skewed data are used (Cassel et al. 1999).  
We use the bootstrapping technique to estimate the significance of the 
relationships in our model (Hair et al. 2012) with the SmartPLS 2.0 software package 
(Ringle et al. 2005). We constructed the same number of observations as in the original 
sample in each of 5,000 bootstrap samples (Hair et al. 2012) and allowed for individual 
sign changes in each procedure (Henseler et al. 2009). To test the hypotheses, we 
assessed the sign and magnitude of the path coefficients and their t-values, obtained by 
applying nonparametric bootstrapping, and calculated effect sizes and total effects 
(Chin, 1998). The following section reports the PLS path coefficients and t-values, 




We analyzed the psychometric properties of the measurement scales through (1) 
individual item reliabilities, (2) the convergent validity of measures associated with 
individual constructs, and (3) discriminant validity (Hulland 1999). Item reliability 
22 
 
measures the degree to which an item loads on its intended construct. Given that the 
shared variance between an item and a construct should be higher than that between the 
construct and error variance, the items should have loadings higher than .7 (Carmines 
and Zeller 1979; Hulland 1999). All items in the measurement model satisfy this 
condition (see Table 2). Second, we examined convergent validity via composite 
reliability (CR) and Cronbach’s alpha, applying the suggested .7 benchmark for 
reliability (Hulland 1999). All measures exceed this benchmark, indicating internal 
consistency (see Table 2). Third, we analyzed the discriminant validity of the measures 
according to whether the average variance extracted (AVE) of a measure was greater 
than .5 and its square root was greater than its coefficients of correlation with the 
other measures (Chin 1998; see Table 4). Table 3 shows that each scale meets these 
criteria. Given that all of Hulland’s (1999) proposed requirements are fulfilled, the 
psychometric properties show adequate reliability and validity. 
 
 
Table 2. Reliability and convergent validity of the measurement model 
Factor Item Loading t-value CA CR AVE 
F1. Entrepreneurial orientation 2nd order   0.84 0.88 0.66 
Inn1 0.791 *** 95.104 0.77 0.87 0.68 
Inn2 0.852 *** 174.621 
Inn3 0.838 *** 146.424 
Pro1 0.851 *** 112.746 0.69 0.83 0.62 
Pro2 0.863 *** 126.839 
Pro3 0.634 *** 41.018 
Rtk1 0.832 *** 140.614 0.80 0.88 0.71 
Rtk2 0.865 *** 163.635 
Rtk3 0.835 *** 127.769 
F2. Firm performance Per1 0.931*** 151.034 0.86 0.93 0.88 
Per2 0.941*** 314.115 
Note: Total sample measurement model: individual reliability, composite reliability, and 







Table 3. Averages, typical deviations, and discriminant validity coefficients for the full 
sample 
Construct Mean SD Minimum  Maximum 1 2 
1. Entrepreneurial orientation 6.28 2.66 0 10 0.66  
2. Firm performance 6.47 1.86 0 10 0.09 0.88 






Table 4. Descriptive statistics and correlations  
  
 Variable Mean S.D. Max Min 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Board size 4.21 1.85 16 3 1.00            
2 EO 6.28 2.66 10 0 0.00 1.00           
3 Family involvement in the board 0.84 0.23 1 0 -0.23 0.12 1.00          
4 Female involvement in the board 0.26 0.23 1 0 0.10 0.04 0.02 1.00         
5 Firm size (log) 1.99 0.24 3.07 1.65 0.07 0.09 -0.10 0.17 1.00        
6 Firm age (log) 1.46 0.19 2.17 0.85 0.24 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.05 1.00       
7 Firm performance 6.47 1.86 10 0 0.00 0.30 0.03 -0.03 0.15 -0.09 1.00      
8 Generation in control 2.03 0.75 4 1 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.07 -0.09 0.48 -0.04 1.00     
9 Generation involvement 1.48 0.58 4 1 0.05 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.12 -0.21 1.00    
10 Innovativeness 6.58 2.73 10 0 -0.04 0.81 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.21 0.04 0.03 1.00   
11 Proactiveness 6.54 2.28 10 0 0.07 0.83 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.27 0.08 0.07 0.54 1.00  





We tested the quality of the structural model assessment by estimating the path 
coefficients, their significance via bootstrap tests, their R² values, and the Stone Geisser 
Criterion (Q²) derived using the blindfolding procedure with an omission distance of 7 
for predictive relevance (Geisser 1975; Stone 1974; Tenenhaus et al. 2005). We 
conducted this analysis for both the total sample and the two subsamples (Real et al. 
2014). The three main paths are significant. Furthermore, our dependent variable 
reached R² values above 0.1 (Falk and Miller 1992). The cross-validated redundancy 
indices (Q²) (Geisser 1975; Stone 1974) confirm that the three structural models have 
satisfactory predictive relevance for the endogenous variable (firm performance).  
 
The direct effect of EO on firm performance and the moderating effect of family and 
female involvement in the board 
To test for the direct effect of EO on firm performance (H1) and the moderation 
hypotheses of family (H2) and female (H3) involvement in the board, we estimated the 
significance of these relationships in our model using the bootstrapping technique (Hair 
et al. 2012). We assessed the sign and magnitude of the path coefficients and their t-
values, which we obtained by applying nonparametric bootstrapping, and calculated 
effect sizes and total effects (Chin 1998).  
The direct effect of EO on firm performance was positive and significant (β= 
0.283; t=17.57 p < .01; R²= 0.130), supporting Hypothesis 1. We next examined the 
path coefficients related to the hypotheses in more detail. For Hypotheses 2 and 3, we 
considered the contingency effects of the family director ratio and female involvement 
in the board on EO-firm performance, respectively. The results indicate that the impact 
of EO on firm performance varies with the family and female involvement in the board. 
On one hand, in line with our expectation, our results indicate that the positive effect of 
EO on firm performance decreases as family involvement in the board increases (β = - 
0.208, t=7.067 p < 0.01; R²= 0.169). These results support Hypothesis 2. On the other 
hand, our results related to Hypothesis 3 show that the positive effect of EO on firm 
performance increases as female involvement in the board increases (β= 0.159; 
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t=13.879 p < .01; R²= 0.155). Specifically, our results indicate that the more women the 
board has, the more intense is the positive effect of EO on firm performance, supporting 
Hypothesis 3.  
 
Multi-group analysis: The moderating effects of SIBD 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 posit the moderating effects of SIBD on the relationships between 
family and female involvement in the board in the EO–firm performance relationship, 
respectively. Following Machold et al. (2011) and Minichilli et al.’s (2009) scales, 
respondents evaluated four items on an 11-point scale (0 = “very low” to 10 = “very 
high”). We then formed an index to calculate the average of these four items and 
dichotomized the data by grouping the SIBD scores (ranging from 0 to10) into three 
equal categories (low, medium, and high levels of SIBD), from lower to higher scores. 
Following Henseler and Fassot (2010), we adopted a multi-group or multi-sample 
analysis.  
A multi-group comparison involves dividing the sample into groups according to 
the moderator variable. Afterwards, we estimated each group of observations in the 
model separately (Real et al. 2014). We considered the statistically significant 
differences in path coefficients between subsamples as moderating effects (Qureshi and 
Compeau 2009). We followed the polar extreme approach developed by Hair et al. 
(2016) and used the two categories in the extreme positions (low and high SIBD) to 
determine whether there was a moderating effect. This technique clearly shows the 
differences among two different groups by avoiding the medium values of the scale that 
can distort the comparison (Picón-Berjoyo et al. 2016). Thus, we divided the sample 
into the following two groups: family SMEs with high SIBD and those with low SIBD. 
We confirmed the significance of the differences between the two categories using 
Chin’s (2000) proposed multi-group analysis (Qureshi and Compeau 2009). We 
examined the moderating effect using a t-test with pooled standard errors (see Table 5). 







Table 5. Multi-group analysis 







H4 Family involvement in the 
board  
0.295 -0.212 0.497*** 15.44 
Yes 
(partially) 
H5 Female involvement in the 
board  
0.237 -0.244 0.481*** 31.89 Yes 
*p < 0.05, t (0.05, 230) =1.97; **p < 0.01, t (0.01, 230) = 2.60; ***p < 0.001, t (0.001, 230) = 3.33. 
 
The findings partially support Hypothesis 4, which proposed that SIBD has a 
significant effect on the negative impact of family involvement on the EO–firm 
performance relationship such that a high SIBD strengthens this effect while a low 
SIBD weakens it. Our results indicate that, as hypothesized, the effect differs 
significantly between the group of family SMEs with high SIBD and the group with low 
SIBD (PathHighSIBD > PathLowSIBD, p < 0.001; see Table 5). While family involvement in 
the board maintains a negative moderating impact in the EO–firm performance link 
among family SMEs with low SIBD, this moderating effect becomes positive for family 
SMEs with high SIBD.  
In line with Hypothesis 5, the results confirm that the influence of female 
involvement in the board on the EO–firm performance link also differs significantly 
between the high-SIBD group of family SMEs and the low-SIBD group (PathHighSIBD > 
PathLowSIBD, p < 0.001; see Table 5). While female involvement in the board maintains a 
positive moderating impact in the EO–firm performance link among family SMEs with 
high SIBD, this moderating effect becomes negative for firms with low SIBD, thus 
supporting Hypothesis 5. 
  
 Discussion 
This study addresses the recent calls to help provide conclusive results to describe the 
EO–firm performance link (Rauch et al. 2009) and incorporate moderating variables 
that clarify this relationship within family businesses (Schepers et al. 2014). Given these 
calls and given that boards are a critical strategic asset that contributes strategic 
perspectives in strategic decision making (Kim et al. 2009), this study posited that 
family and female involvement in boards meaningfully affects the EO–firm 
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performance relationship in family SMEs. Boards in these organizations make decisions 
differently from non-family public companies, as they are more concerned about firm 
survival, family welfare, and succession plans than about obtaining short-term financial 
returns (Pugliese and Wenstop 2007). This study also focuses on the role of behavioral 
variables and distinguishes between the two board composition effects among firms 
with high SIBD and low SIBD. The empirical investigation, based on a sample of 230 
family SMEs in Spain, produced some interesting results that have important 
implications for both research and practice. 
Concerning family/non-family director diversity measured using the family 
director ratio, lower levels of family involvement in the board enhanced the positive 
impact of EO on firm performance in family SMEs. This supports our argument that 
boards with high family involvement have more risk aversion toward entrepreneurial 
initiatives (Gomez-Mejía et al. 2007) and are less prepared to design successful 
entrepreneurial initiatives due to their limited knowledge, perspectives, expertise, and 
network diversity (Lai and Chen 2014). This finding is important because, although 
previous studies have examined TMT heterogeneity in the EO–firm performance 
relationship, there is a lack of research on the effect that board diversity may have on 
EO–firm performance. Furthermore, considering that EO results from the collaboration 
between the TMT and board members (Eddleston et al. 2008), our research findings 
complement those of Van Doorn et al. (2013) related to the impact of TMT 
heterogeneity on the EO–firm performance relationship. Future research should build on 
these findings and investigate the effect of different levels of family involvement in the 
TMT and board when collaborating to turn EO into successful firm performance. We 
also found that the board’s strategic involvement level affects the moderating effect of 
the family involvement level in the EO–firm performance relationship. Contrary to our 
expectations, a high SIBD changes the indirect effect of high family involvement in the 
board from negative to positive, while low SIBD maintains its negative effect. This 
result may have occurred because boards with a high family director ratio can 
counteract the negative effects of their lack of diverse knowledge, expertise, and 
perspectives by developing an active strategic attitude, which may motivate family 
directors to establish professional connections with professional consultancy firms that 
can add their knowledge of how to succeed in entrepreneurial initiatives. 
29 
 
Regarding the influence of female involvement in the board on the EO–firm 
performance relationship, higher levels of female involvement strengthen the positive 
impact of EO on firm performance in family SMEs. This supports our arguments that 
higher levels of female involvement in the board better position firms to adopt higher- 
quality decisions (Ali et al. 2014) given that women contribute different knowledge, 
expertise, and skills, which add a wider variety of perspectives (Terjesen et al. 2009) 
and may complement male directors’ characteristics (Adams and Ferreira 2009). In 
addition, apart from women’s outstanding marketing and sales competencies, their 
lower tendency toward risk aversion (Croson and Gneezy 2009), and their tendency 
toward more supportive leadership styles for entrepreneurial initiatives (Post and Byron 
2015), firms can recruit directors without discriminating based on sex (Credit Suisse 
2012) to obtain better talent (Ali et al. 2014). This finding is important given the 
inconclusive results about the effects of female involvement in the board on various 
tasks (Post and Byron 2015). We also showed that SIBD impacts the moderating effect 
of female involvement in the board in the EO–firm performance relationship. In line 
with our expectations, we found that, while a high SIBD enhances the positive 
moderating effect of female involvement in the board in the in EO-firm performance 
relationship, a low SIBD weakens it. As hypothesized, male and female directors 
behave differently, which may initially result in mistrust between these two types of 
directors and create conflict (Adams and Ferreira 2009). These conflicts may result in 
less fluid communication and cooperation, especially when directors are not highly 
involved in strategy (Campbell and Minguez-Vera 2008). However, when board 
members become highly involved in strategic tasks, communication and cooperation 
between directors improves, and the initial mistrust between female and male directors 
disappears. Furthermore, a higher SIBD appears to help firms take advantage of the 
complementary perspectives that female and male directors have, creating active debate 
about entrepreneurial initiatives and boosting creativity, which may turn into successful 
entrepreneurial outcomes. 
 
Implications, limitations, and future research  
In terms of theoretical implications, our study underscores the importance of 
board diversity in family firms by demonstrating that both female and family 
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involvement in the board enhances the EO’s positive effects on firm performance. This 
is important considering the need to examine different moderating variables to clarify 
the inconclusive results for EO–firm performance within family businesses (Schepers et 
al. 2014) and to help researchers better understand the effects of board composition 
because boards are considered major strategic assets (Kim et al. 2009). This study also 
suggests that the effects of board composition depend on its SIBD, shedding light on 
this little-known behavior variable.  
Furthermore, the implications of board diversity and board behavior reach beyond 
academia. From a managerial perspective, this study has two important implications for 
practitioners. The first relates to the fact that most boards in family businesses have 
historically comprised male (Wilson et al. 2013) family members (Voordeckers et al. 
2007). However, this study reveals that introducing more non-family members and 
female directors may provide diverse perspectives on strategic issues that may help the 
firm succeed in its entrepreneurial initiatives. The second implication relates to the 
board’s strategic involvement. SIBD may be very important for family business owners: 
a high SIBD may enhance the positive effect of high female involvement in the board, 
while low strategic involvement may turn this positive effect negative. On the other 
hand, boards with high family involvement should engage more actively to take 
advantage of family directors’ knowledge about the firm’s internal processes, which 
may contribute to the success of entrepreneurial initiatives. 
Like any study, this one is subject to a number of limitations, which open avenues 
for future research. First, our study is cross-sectional. Further evidence is needed on the 
causal relationships between the dependent and independent variables through 
longitudinal research. However, we based our hypotheses on existing theory (e.g., 
Rauch et al. 2009) and tested for common method bias (Podsakoff and Organ 1986), 
and did not find any concerns that may have affected our results (Kellermanns and 
Eddleston 2006). However, future research could help explain the potential changes in 
firm performance over time by collecting longitudinal data on CEOs’ views of EO, 
SIBD, and board composition in their firms. Second, drawing a sample of SMEs from a 
single national context, Spain, has its limitations. EO is closely linked to cultural 
contingencies as well as family firms’ characteristics, which vary across countries (Cruz 
and Nordqvist 2012). Thus, future studies should replicate this research in other cultural 
settings. Third, apart from the behavioral variable SIBD, we included only female 
involvement and family member involvement as characteristics of board diversity to 
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examine the potential moderating effect of board diversity in the conceptual model and 
empirical analyses. In this regard, a serious limitation of this study is that it did not 
differentiate between independent directors and affiliates, whose contributions to 
strategy decision making can differ significantly (Samara and Berbegal-Mirabent 2017). 
Thus, it would be interesting to measure the moderating effect of board diversity in the 
EO–firm performance relationship by dividing directors into affiliates and independent 
ones, given that, while the formers usually have strong social ties with senior managers 
and know the internal business dynamics (Anderson and Reeb, 2004), the latter may add 
industry- and market-specific knowledge (Chen et al. 2016) and can be perceived as a 
threat to family decision making (Jones et al. 2008). It would also be useful to examine 
the moderating effect on the EO–firm performance link in family firms that board 
composition may have in terms of directors’ tenure and/or the number of boards the 
directors are serving on simultaneously (Nekhili and Gatfaoui 2013). Both factors may 
have an important impact because board characteristics generally contribute to the 
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Appendix 5.1. Common method bias 
  
Substantive factor Common method factor 
Construct Item Loading R1 Loading R1² Loading R2 Loading R2² 
Entrepreneurial orientation Inn1 0.79 0.6241 0.06 0.0036 
Inn2 0.85 0.7225 0.08 0.0064 
Inn3 0.84 0.7056 0.01 0.0001 
Pro1 0.85 0.7225 0.10 0.01 
Pro2 0.86 0.7396 0.09 0.0081 
Pro3 0.63 0.3969 0.10 0.01 
Rtk1 0.83 0.6889 0.02 0.0004 
Rtk2 0.87 0.7569 0.01 0.0001 
Rtk3 0.84 0.7056 0.04 0.0016 
Firm performance Per1 0.93 0.8649 0.06 0.0036 
Per2 0.94 0.8836 0.12 0.0144 
Average   0.7101  0.0067 




𝑡 =  






≈ 𝑡 (𝑚 + 𝑛 − 2) 
This is a one-tailed t-Student distribution with (m + n – 2) degrees of freedom, where Sp is the 
pooled estimator for the variance, m is the number of cases in the sample of family SMEs with 
high SIBD, n is the number of cases with low SIBD, and SE is the standard error for the path 
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